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Protracted Refugee Situations
and the Right of Return
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fl ccording to the United Nations High CommissionFl for Refugees (UNHCR), protracted displacement
situations occur where no durable solution has been found
five years after that displacement took place, though the
U.S. Committee for Refugees and lmmigrants (USCRI)
describes them as "warehoused" after a period often
years. Protracted refugees and internally displaced peoples
(lDPs) are often correlated with protracted violent
conflicts over a long period. However, there is no
necessary linkage. Tutsi refugees remained in a protracted
situation for approximately 30 years, but the violence had
ceased almcst a quarter of a century before, resuming only
in 1990. Bhutanese refugees lived in camps in Nepal
for years without a protracted confiict. In protracted
situations resulting from forced displacement, in a context
of physical and psychological insecurity, most refugees'
lives remain on hold confined to refugee camps often in
remote, desolate and dangerous border areas in countries
of first asylum usually without rights of mobility or
employment and very limited opportunities to engage in
commerce or trade. Militias and locals often prey on them,
In addition to material deprivation, they sulfer from
psychosocial problems, vir:lence and sexual exploitation.
Their sense of self worth is eviscerated by hopelessness
and despair, Compassion fatigue cften leads to the
provision cf reduced rations and services,
Approximately 4,5 of 6.2 million refugees under
UNHCR protection live in protracted refugee situations,
mostly in Africa and Asia. According to a 2004 report by
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UNHCR, the average duration of protracted situations
increased from nine to "17 years between i 993 and 2003.
There are now also twice as many lDPs than refugees in
protracted situations.
The oldest extant protracted refugee situation in the
world is that of the Palestinian refugees. Over 700,000 fled
or were forced io flee the hostilities that occurred in 1948
when five Arab armies invaded the new UN-endorsed,
Jewish state. In their 2006 report on the lraq \Ahr for the
U.S. Congress, entitled't-he lraq Study Group Report:
The Way ForwarcJ 
- 
A New Approach, Lee H. Hamiltorr
and former U.S. Secretary of State James A, Baker | | |
recommended addressing the right of return to end the
conflict, President Bush repeated the centrality ofthe right
of return instead of the formula, ajust solution to the
Palestinian refugee conflict. What did the settlement
of the lraq War have to do with the "right of return" of
Palestinian refugees to homes from which they have fled,
in 1948, in what is now lsrael? ls there a right of return?
Has anyfhing ever been done anywhere at any time to
implement it?
The right of return is included in a plethora of
international covenants and documents in addition
to the myriad of resolutions passed by the U N General
Assembly rnterpreting the original 1948 resolution and
urging lsraelto permit return fcllowing a peace agreemert
when and if refugees agreed to return in peace. Can a
rights-based approach help resolve the problem and find
durable solutinns for these refugees? Article 13(2) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "[veryone
has the right to ieave any country, including his own, and
to return to his country." The Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (.tuty ZA, 1951), in Article 1(C), insists
that only the refugee can freely determine whether or
not to return to his home or country. Article 12{4) of the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides the displaced with a "right to enter his own
country." Rights guarantee freedom of movement.
Prior to the 1990s, UNHCR emphasized voluntariness
and the exercise of free will by the individual refugee in
contemplating return. The exercise of that free willwas
linked with the disappearance of the sources of the
violence that had stimulated the exodus rather than
as an exercise of a right. Return was not to be coerced.
However, UNHCR's 1996 Fiandbook on Voiuntarv
Repatriation: International Protection, which can be traced
back to UNHCR's September 1993 draft "Protection
Guide on Voluntary Repatriation," subsumed voluntary
repatriation under the right of return rather than linking
return simply with changing conditions, namely reduced
violence. ls repatriation as a right the solution for refugees
and lDPs in protracted refugee situations?
Currently, there are over 1 million refugees in
Zimbabwe; almost '1,5 million lDPs in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and a similar number in northern
Uganda: 750,000 in COte d'lvoire; 250,000 in Georgia;
over 500,000 in Azerbaljan (though 60,000 Georgian
refugees returned to Abkhazia's Gali District where the
Georgians constitute the mqjority); an estimated 4 million
plus in Colombia resulting from both the civil and
narcotics wars; over 3 million Afghanis who remain as
refuqees and lDPs; and over 2 million lraqi refugees
and over 2 million lraqi lDPs as a byproduct of the
U.S.-led invasion, the resultant insurgency, internal
ethnic and religious wars. Though rnany will return
when the violence stops, it is unlikely there will be returns
where the returnees constitute a minority. Look at the
historical record.
In the organized return of Indochinese refugees
beginning in the late 1980s, no ethnic minorities were
returned. In Rwanda, Tutsis returned from almost 30 years
in exile in 1994 but only behind the victorious Tutsi-led
rebel army and only after aimost 1 million Tutsi civilians
were slaughtered by Hutlt extremists in the worst genocide
since the Holocaust. When 1 million Hutus were released
from the control of the extremists in Zaire (now the
Democratic Republic of the Congo) after the fbrmer
Rwandan government army and its militia allies in Zaire
were defeated, the Hutu refugees returned to Rwanda
where they constituted 85% of the population. In addition
to Zaire, the Tanzanian government forced an additional
500,000 Hutus to return. In contrast, after the war broke
out in the late 1990s between tthiopia and Eritrea, those
of l"-thiopian and Fritrean extraction living in the cpposite
countfy who were forced or "encoilraged" to leave have
not been r:ermitted to return.
Following the Dayton Accords, leaders in the \A€st,
strongly supported by NGOs and international agencies,
were committed to cease ethnic cleansing in Bosnia by
repatriating the refugees. The High Representative of the
UN Secretary-General had the power to force recalcitrant
local officials to follow the policy and remove the
obstreperous ones who did not. The international
community invested enormous amounts of money to
implement this policy. More than half of the 2 million
refugees returned and Eosnia was cited as a successful case
of repatriation. However, the vast mqjority were ethnic-
mqjority returns and many cases recorded as minority
returns included those who had only returned to reclaim
and sell their property. Genuine cases of minority returns
to mqiority controlled towns and areas consisted mostly
of the elderly who were in no position to restart their lives.
Relatively little genLrine minority repatriation took place.
In the Kosovo war in '1999, the UN Security Council
resolution '1239, adopted on May '14, 1999, decreed "the
right of all refugees and displaced persons to retufn to
their homes in safety and in dignity." NATO military
action against Serbia enforced the decree but did far too
little to ensure the security and safety ofthe Serbian
minority except in the small enclaves where they were
the mqjority, Consequently, tens of thousands oi Serbs
fled Kosovo.
Similar events took place during the same period in Asia.
Following the withdrawal of the Indonesians from East
Timor after the independence movement won the vote, a
large return to East Timor took place, but new refugees
fled to Ind*nesia. The t hotshampa refugees, who were
denaturalized and had been chased out or had fled Bhutan
in the 'l9B0s, were not reintegrated into Nepal but kept
in refugee camps, In October 2006, the U,S, offeretJ to
resettle 60,000 BhutanesCI refugees, with Canada,
Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand and
Australia agreeing to pick up the rest who want to resettle,
In Burma, there were two separate failed repatriations
of the Rohingyas, the first resulting in their wide scale
abuse which forced most to flee again and undercut
any possibility of the second effori succeeding. The
international community never tried to repatriate the
large number of Burmese refugees along the Thai border.
However, the international community, again led by the
U.S.. has recently initiated a resettlement policy along
with a small effort to integrate some of the refugees into
Thailand. In Sri Lanka, after lDPs fled the battle between
the Sinhalese-dominated government in Colomi:o and
the Thmil Tigers, Hindu Tamils were resettled to ensure
Sinhalese both demographic as well as strategic control
of certain areas.
In southern Sudan, a large return movement began
after a peace agreement was signed in 20A4 between the
Khartoum government and the Southern rebels. As a
result, refugees began returning to areas where their ethnic
group was the mqicrity, Before ink had been put on paper
to settle the southern war, a rebellron broke out in the
Darfur region of western Sudan, and the government of
Khartoum, with the support of nomadic Arab rnilitias,
initiated the ethnic cleansing of the African agriculturalists,
fhe Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa. Over 2 million were
internally displaced and 200,000 fled to Chad. lrr spite of
lhe presence clf large numbers of humanitarian workers,
a reiatively iarge peacekeeping force, the widespread
condemnation of the actions of the Sudanese government,
and the prosecution of Sudanese governmenl officials
by the International Criminal Court, there is no sign of
return for the displaced, a return that continues lo be
unlikely unless coercive force is used,
Returning to [urope, in 2004 Kofi Annan proposed a
peace agreement for cyprus endorsed by Greece, Turkey
and the EU that called for non-repatriation of refugees
and TUrkrsh settlers brought into Cyprus by the occupying
Turk power in the north. The Greek Cypriots rqjected
the deat althoLrgh practice belies the right of return
widely upheld.
The failure to integrate refugees iocally or resettle them
abroad often produces refugee warriors who continue
to destabilize the states from which they fled as well as
neighbouring states. Refugee camps become a base
from which they wage war, recruit others, or rest,
unintentionally abetted by the humanitarian aid avaiiable
in the refugee camps.
Authorities and donors can ensure that aid meets
the basic needs of refugees but this will not resolve the
protracted nature of the refugee and IDP crisis. One can
followthe UNRiVA (United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) model to
increase the capacity of refugees through education and
training programs and to increase the readiness of refugees
to seek meaningful and productive employment, for
such paints in the future when durable solutions are
available. Such a policy was made public in the Pre-ExCom
Consultations, "Moving Forward: ldentifying Specific
Measures to [nd Refugee \A/arehousing" (September 2004,
29), and in an alphabet soup of partnership programs based
on C+, CPA, f DS, DAR, the 4Rs and DCl. But this does
nothing to aid the search for durable solutions and nothinq
to end the protracted situation of refugees.
Another proactive response to protracted situations is
a rights-based approach as opposed to a needs-based or
capacity-building approach. Instead of merely tryinq to
ensure that the standards in the camps meet minimum
conditions, and instead of going one step further and
trying to build the capacities of those refugees, countries
of first asylum are urged to guarantee the rights of
refugees to move and seek employment so that refugees
can be economically integrated even if they are not
politically integrated, a progrsm consistent with the
1951 Rcfugec Convcntion.
There are a number of reasons why countries of first
asylum are extremely reluctant to r:ffer more rights to
refugees: rising unemployment rates in their own countries
could lead to domestic unrest if refiqees were given
the opporl.unity to work; such rights would provide a
disincent.ive for refugees lo retilrn home and an act as a
magrlet for others to come; and settlement would not
encourage refugee-exporting countries to look for
solutions. The policy of local integratian, which was
the original mandate for UNRTVA in dealing with the
Palestinian refugees, largely did not work. What about
pushing for another set of rights. the right of refugees
t0 return to their homes?
The "right of return" has become a symbol for resolving
refugee crises the world over lest ethnic cleansing be
legitimized. On December 23,2A04, the Tibetan Refugee
Welfare Office in Nepal and the fminent Persons Group
on Refugee and Migratory Movements in Sri Lanka
issued a statement calling for solutions to end refugee
warehousing that was endorsed by more than 100
organizations and a great number of individuals including
refugee law scholars and human rights activists as well
as four Nobel laureates, Archbishop Desmond Tutu
among them. This right appJies despite whether or not
the individual or group held citizenship in the state that
ncw controls lhe territory from which the flight took
place. Furthermore, the right has been extended to
progeny not born in the country from which the refugees
fled, For many, return provides an assumed soiution to
the refugee crises.
However, a century of historical practice indicates
that when ethnic or religious rninorities are uprooted,
the displacement is most often permanent even when the
international community makes strenuous efforts, except
when coercive force is used. The discrepancy between the
morai ideals of repatriation and its implausibility in the
real world in cases of ethnic conflict has not led to any
re-evaluation of the principles or the language of rights.
Emphasizing feturn as a durable solution in cases of
minority return perpetuates the plight of refugees and
extends the protracted situation while prolonging the
misery of refuqees and fosterinq the creation of refugee
warriors. Insistence on a right of minority repatriation
only leads to greater misery for refugees and inhibits the
deveiopment of more feasible solutions.
The pre,emirrence of ethnicity as a source of vrolence is
not necessarily applicable in cases of ideological conflict as
in the case of Afghanistan. The Tripartite Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Government of the Kingdom
of Sweden, the Government of the lslamic Republic of
Afghanistan, and UNHCR signed in Kabul on December
26,zAW, designed to help Afghan refugees return
recognized "that the right of all citizens to leave and to
return to their country is a basic human right enshrined,
inter alia, in Article 13(2) of the 1948 lJniversal
Declaration of Human Rights and Art.icle 1 2 of the 1966
International Covenanl on Civil and Political Rights."
Return was oslensibly based on internaiional human rights
agreements guaranteeing that right, 3ut Afghan return
was a matter of m{ority reiurn. Other than the continuing
violence clf Lhe Taliban, which clearly irnpeded return,
there was no threat to the returnees because of their
ethnic identity. This was not a case ol minority return
and lhe citation of a righl to feturn was superfiuous to
the actual repatriation.
Mqjority return following a political settlement is often
successful and does not reqlrire the citation of a right
to return. Minority repatriation has almost never been
implemented successfirlly, except through force. Citing a
right to return has not and will not reverse the reality.
ll in cases of ethnic and religious conflict, administrative
and political energies are spent holding refugees in
"temporary" camps for long periods in the hopes that fhey
can be repatriated when the violent conflict ends, return
will remain forlorn and refugees will suffer unnecessarily.
Of course, while resettlement with reparations may solve
the individuai deprivation, it may undermine the
contribution of refugees to the self-determination
cf the group,
